This smiling suicide bomber grew up in Bavaria Germany and went to Afghanistan ot blow himself up. The German police knew of him, but did nothing! I guess he had "rights".
This bomber along with the Britich born London suicide bombers proves that homegrown terrorism is growing. We know that the 9/11 hijackers trained here in the USA. It's a sure bet that there are simular jihadists here now, but the liberals in our government are turning a blind eye to the problem. I'm sure that the day will come when we will regret this stupidity. Unfortunately, innocent Americans will die for it!
Watch the video and share it with your friends please. Download it and pass it around too!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJvHPRsbVj8
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Wednesday, April 30, 2008
The Smiling Bavarian Taliban!
Sunday, April 27, 2008
London Suicide Bombers Goodbye
This killer is explaining to his little girl why he won't be there when she grows up!
What about the other little girls whose father or mother didn't come home that awful day?
What about the parents, whose children perished?
This is a Religion Of Peace? In my bood it doesn't classify as a religion at all!
Notice the British accent? This guy wasn't an immegrant, he was a home grown TERRORIST!
Thursday, April 24, 2008
UN: Libya compares Gaza to ‘concentration camps’, French Ambassador walks out
UN: Libya compares Gaza to ‘concentration camps’, French Ambassador walks out
April 24th, 2008
pals-jabalya.jpg
Gaza ‘Concentration Camp’
* This is unbearable: Islamic terrorists and representatives of the most oppressive regimes have hijacked the UN-security council. This charade has to end.
France on Wednesday led a walkout of Western envoys from a UN Security Council debate on the Middle East after Libya compared the situation in the besieged Gaza Strip to Nazi “concentration camps,” diplomats said.
One diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said France’s UN Ambassador Jean-Maurice Ripert took off his earpiece and walked out, followed by his Western colleagues, after his Libyan counterpart Giadalla Ettalhi made the remarks.
Speaking to reporters after the debate, Syria’s UN Ambassador Bashar Jaafari told reporters: “Unfortunately those who complain of being victims of genocide (during World War II) are repeating the same kind of genocide against the Palestinians.”
“The issue for us is to see the Security Council properly involved in finding solutions” to the crisis, in particular “the Israeli persecution of the Palestinians,” he added.
The incident occurred as the 15-member council was trying to agree on a compromise statement that would have highlighted the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza while also contributing positively to efforts to reach an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
South Africa’s UN Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo, the council chairman this month, told reporters that members “could not agree” on the statement.
In previous months, the council had several times tried and failed to agree on a statement regarding the crippling Israeli siege of Gaza in response to rocket fire from Palestinian militants based in Gaza.
AFP
rally-gaza-1-04.jpg
So, does this mean the French are finally developing some gonads? and since when were the Jews in the concentration camps armed? - Nuke
Bishop tells Muslims ‘you’re in denial’
Bishop tells Muslims ‘you’re in denial’
Bishop Nazir Ali
MUSLIMS were accused of being “in denial” by the senior Christian bishop accused of inflaming anti-Islamic feeling by declaring extremists have made parts of Britain “no go areas” for non-Muslims.
Bishop of Rochester, Dr Michael Nazir Ali, defended himself against a barrage of criticism at an inter-faith meeting at Ilford Islamic Centre on Friday.
Organised by the East London Three Faiths Forum, about 200 people packed into the Albert Road, Ilford, centre.
One Muslim man said after the “no go” comments hit the news his family was targeted.
He said: “Surely you must have known there would be this tremendous backlash, our windows broken, our sisters and wives spat at?”
Assistant imam of the South Woodford Muslim Community Centre and Mosque, Abdulrahman Tejan Bangura, fumed: “How many times do the wider community need to be educated about the fact that extremism is un-Islamic? Anyone that’s practising extremism is not a Muslim.”
* How many times have we heard BS like this before?
Dr Nazir Ali said both Christians and Muslims needed to stop being defensive in order to move forward.
He said: “The fact of the matter is that extremists who call themselves Islamic extremists, whether they should attach themselves to that name or not is not for me to judge, have made it so difficult for Christian workers in particular places even to live.
“Christian clergy have been prevented from distributing literature in people’s homes, Christian workers have been attacked or intimidated.
“I think the Muslim community and wider community both, need to attend to this situation and address it, rather than being in denial.”
Centre spokesman Mohammed Azam said an “unfortunate understanding of Islam” had sprouted because some mosques were teaching Arabic “by rote” and without a true understanding of the Koran. He added: “There is extremism and we’d be foolish not to recognise that.”
EUROPE FACING RADICALIZATION OVER THE WEB
Middle East Times
By OLIVIER GUITTA
A few months ago Bernard Squarcini the head of the DST (Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire), the French equivalent of the FBI, told the French daily Libération regarding Islamic radicalization: "An ideological transformation can be done in three months on the Web. An individual can at night auto-radicalize himself via the Web and get in touch with leaders of terrorist organizations." This assessment shows how dire the situation is in Europe when it comes to al-Qaida's use of the Web.
Al-Qaida uses the web for four different tasks: propaganda; communication, mostly to instruct those in the field; training future combatants, a kind of online university of terrorism; and to send messages to the enemy, mostly to the West.
For instance, one of the most popular jihadist sites in France is one which translates books on the jihad in French and gives lessons on urban guerilla tactics. (This site got more than 3 million visits from France alone). Another Web site explains how to get weapons in the West (hide, assemble and breakdown) and how to manufacture bombs from products found in supermarkets.
The propaganda primarily targets youngsters. Some of them join the virtual jihad or "webtifada", i.e. cyber criminality.
In March 2006, the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Exterieure), the French equivalent of the CIA, tracked down a forum where jihadists recruited hackers to destroy "infidels'" Web sites and government sites. The jihadists recommended: "If you can't slash their throats, then at least destroy their sites." And on May 15, 2006 the Metz, France police arrested a young man who, under the alias Yanis, had attacked 1,161 sites including 710 linked to the Muhammad cartoons controversy.
Fortunately in Europe, even though the number is growing only a minority is actually joining the virtual jihad. According to Louis Caprioli, ex-boss of the anti-terror unit of the DST, the number of French volunteers in Iraq is in the tens. Confirming this, expert Walter Akmouche states that statistically, to get one jihadi, you must contact an average 45,000 people.
Which vehicle do the jihadis use on the Web? According to the DST, the chat room Paltalk is regularly used to hide operations. They also use Instant Messaging services such as Messenger or Skype and "dead e-mail boxes" which allow them, with the username and password, to retrieve unsent messages. But they also exchange information and coded files on forums devoted to soccer, music or any topic totally unrelated to Islam.
It is important to note that to access true terrorist sites; one has to be an insider and needs to know the real number-coded URL address, which often changes.
Also after years of research, al-Qaida has developed software called "Secrets of Mujahedin," that allows secure exchange in Arabic on electronic networks. It has allegedly been in use for over a year on clandestine forums close to al-Qaida, especially for jihadist groups in Iraq and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. This has been a formidable weapon for al-Qaida and numerous intelligence services and private companies have been trying to break it.
How is Europe facing this threat? First by closely monitoring jihadist Web sites. For instance, last year, Holland devoted 10 million euros (about $15 million) to fighting extremism. Thus, more than 150 Internet sites broadcasting extremist ideology were the subject of complaints and were restricted.
In France, about 30 potentially dangerous sites are monitored by some units of the UCLAT (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte antiterroriste), the French counterterrorism coordination unit. Software allows them to trace back the origin of a server or the IP address of a user and if they act fast, they can trace the network and use it against the Islamists using it. For instance, the recent monitoring of a forum allowed the unit to trace a couple of Salafist groups in the suburbs of Paris that were recruiting jihadis and organizing their trip.
One of the main problems facing European authorities is that simply shutting down Web sites is not very efficient since these sites just end up operating under new names. [COUNTER-JIHADISTS SITES KEEP THE JIHADISTS BUSY, SO GET ON THE WEB AND BEGIN FIGHTING THIS CYBER JIHAD ALREADY]
European countries are also using the legal tool to fight al-Qaida's use of the Web in Europe. In a first, a Swiss court last summer sentenced several individuals including the widow of the killer of Ahmad Shah Massoud, Afghanistan's Northern Alliance's leader killed by al-Qaida on September 9, 2001, and her boyfriend, for having created and operated four Web sites and chat rooms for extremist propaganda and exchange of information by terrorist groups.
European authorities are taking this issue very seriously. On Feb. 1, France's interior minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie told the French daily Le Figaro that the use of the Web by terrorists was "one of my major concerns, and one of the priorities assigned to the [security] services. This requires additional material, forces specialized in fighting cyber-criminality, legal resources. I want us to be able to stop the terrorist propaganda, find the operational networks, track them down and prevent them from acting."
[LET'S KEEP THESE JIHADISTS BUSY WITH OUR COUNTER-CYPER JIHAD]
Wednesday, April 23, 2008
WHAT? Time Is It??
Muslim scientists and clerics: It's time for Mecca Time
FUNNY; I DON'T SEE ANY CLOCKS!!
(Actualy, I see a lot of FROCKS!)
They want to replace Greenwich Mean Time with Mecca Time, since, after all, as everyone knows, Mecca is the center of the earth.
And then the noble mujahedin can sing this song to the dirty kuffar:
When it's time to relax
One thing stands clear:
If you've got the time
We've got the bier!
Cultural Supremacism Alert: "Muslim call to adopt Mecca time," by Magdi Abdelhadi for BBC News (thanks to all who sent this in):
Muslim scientists and clerics have called for the adoption of Mecca time to replace GMT, arguing that the Saudi city is the true centre of the Earth.
Mecca is the direction all Muslims face when they perform their daily prayers.
The call was issued at a conference held in the Gulf state of Qatar under the title: Mecca, the Centre of the Earth, Theory and Practice.
One geologist argued that unlike other longitudes, Mecca's was in perfect alignment to magnetic north.
He said the English had imposed GMT on the rest of the world by force when Britain was a big colonial power, and it was about time that changed.
Mecca watch
A prominent cleric, Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawy, said modern science had at last provided evidence that Mecca was the true centre of the Earth; proof, he said, of the greatness of the Muslim "qibla" - the Arabic word for the direction Muslims turn to when they pray....
The meeting in Qatar is part of a popular trend in some Muslim societies of seeking to find Koranic precedents for modern science.
It is called "Ijaz al-Koran", which roughly translates as the "miraculous nature of the holy text".
The underlying belief is that scientific truths were also revealed in the Muslim holy book, and it is the work of scholars to unearth and publicise the textual evidence.
But the movement is not without its critics, who say that the notion that modern science was revealed in the Koran confuses spiritual truth, which is constant, and empirical truth, which depends on the state of science at any given point in time.
Gee, ya think?
[SIREN THINKS THAT MECCA SHOULD BE NUKED]
Thursday, April 17, 2008
HAMAS OFFICIALLY ENDORSES OBAMA
Top Hamas Advisor, Ahmed Yousuf endorses Obama: ‘Great Man with a Great Principle’
Watch the video and listen for yourself.
Audio: "We like Mr. Obama, and we hope that he will win the elections," Ahmed Yousuf, Hamas' top political adviser in the Gaza Strip, said.
This is abhorrent! Last I checked Hamas is on the international terrorist organizations list. Hamas is not only attacking Israel, but also expanding far beyond the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with their terror.
I wonder if Obama will take a trip down to visit Yousuf and his Hamas mullahs like Carter is doing now. In that case I would suggest he goes to Sderot then. Hamas destroyed that Israeli town, but then again we never saw that in the media. Thousands were killed.
UNBELIEVABLE!
Sunday, April 13, 2008
Jimmy Carter to Meet With Hamas Leader in Syria
-cross posted from Fire Base America
“It’s about par for the course from President Carter, demonstrating a lack of judgment typical of what he does," said John Bolton,
Saturday, April 12, 2008
Religion Of Peace?
The author of this video encourages everyone to download this and post it on other sites. See the end of the video for confirmation.
Spread the word, the world will NOT stand still for these people to kill us!
Thursday, April 10, 2008
Want a Homeland Security grant?
Hamas connections? No problem, apparently;
Starting in 2005 DHS, through FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, commenced a program - UASI Non-Profit Security Grants - the purpose of which was to provide:
"...funding support for target hardening activities to nonprofit organizations that are at high risk of international terrorist attack. While this funding is provided specifically to high-risk nonprofit organizations, the program seeks to integrate nonprofit preparedness activities with broader state and local preparedness efforts..." [[DHS FY 2007 UASI Guidance]
In 2007 the amount available for this program was $24,007,500.00 [DHS FY UASI Grant Fund Distribution]
"...Criteria for determining eligible applicants who are at high risk of terrorist attack include, but are not limited to:
Identification and substantiation (e.g. police reports or insurance claims) of prior threats or attacks against the nonprofit organization or directly related organizations (within or outside the U.S.) by a terrorist organization, network, or cell.
Symbolic value of the site(s) as a highly recognized national or historical institution that renders the site a possible target of terrorism.
Role of the applicant nonprofit organization in responding to or recovering from terrorist attacks
Findings from previously conducted risk assessments including threat, vulnerability or consequence.
In a 2007 article for Front Page Magazine Homeland Security's Islamist Payday, Joe Kaufman broke the story that a Florida based Islamist, Sofian Abdelaziz Zakkout, had been the recipient of one of these UASI grants.
The resulting controversy apparently temporarily halted the awarding of the grant, which was resubmitted for further review.
In a series of calls made to DHS, these writers have now ascertained that the review of Zakkout's grant proposal is complete and that the agency charged with securing the American homeland, has in its infinite wisdom awarded Zakkout $69, 885.00, to be used to purchase security hardware for 23 mosques in Florida's largest counties, Broward, Palm Beach, Miami and Dade.
What kind of individual is Sofian Abdelaziz Zakkout?
He is a long-time Islamist and a supporter of Hamas.
Monday, April 7, 2008
Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week 2 - Stop the Genocide!!
Terrorism Awareness Project
http://www.terrorismawareness.org/
-cross posted from Fire Base America
Sunday, April 6, 2008
"RADICAL" ISLAM IN THEIR OWN WORDS
Fox news called it "Radical Islam in their own words"...however we all know the truth
IF NOT READ THE KORAN AND SEE FOR YOURSELF!!!
OK LET'S SAY THAT THE ONLY ONES WHO WANT TO KILL US ARE THE RADICALS, THEN LET'S DO THE MATH!
1,3 BILLION MUSLIMS IN THE WORLD
LET'S BE EXTREMELY GENEROUS AND SAY THAT ONLY 4% ARE RADICAL
THAT EQUALS 52 MILLION PEOPLE WHO WANT TO KILL US UNDER THE NAME OF ISLAM!
LET'S BE A LITTLE LESS GENEROUS AND SAY THAT 10% ARE RADICAL
THAT EQUALS 130 MILLION PEOPLE WHO WANT TO KILL US UNDER THE NAME OF ISLAM!
THAT'S A HELL OF A LOT OF PEOPLE....
MUSLIMS THEMSELVES SAY ONLY 20% ARE RADICAL... YOU DO THE MATH
(260 MILLION PEOPLE)
DON'T FORGET
APRIL 7-11 IS ISLAMOFASCISM AWARENESS WEEK!!!
http://terrorismawareness.com
Wednesday, April 2, 2008
Jihadist post anthrax-making instructions
The website disclosed the illustrated instructions March 17 and included additional links, and promised to provide information on a delivery system in the future, a Cessna airplane.
“The wait has been long, but the time has arrived, God willing. It is the glad tidings of being able to use biological weapons against the enemies of God. So, allow me to present to you a simple recipe for making anthrax, God willing,” the web site stated.
“Anthrax is an effective and lethal weapon,” the report said. “It is cheap and easy to make. One kilogram of anthrax may be produced in a small test tube with a spore sample that is kept in a special incubator for just 96 hours.”
“Sprinkling 50 kilograms of powder containing anthrax spores along a distance of 2 kilometers will form a lethal cloud that could travel with the wind a distance of more than 20 kilometers, reaching people inside their homes — even with sealed doors and windows.”
To produce a kilo of spores costs about $50 and a lethal doze is no more than one-millionth of gram, or no bigger than a speck of dust.
The posting includes the text of one of the anthrax letters sent to U.S. officials in 2001.
The instructions include using Petri dishes to multiply samples of anthrax, and then adding powder that will allow it to float in the air.
The writer appears to be Saudi as he mentions the cost of several items in Saudi riyals. “I would be happy if you used biological weapons against the enemies of God,” the poster stated.
As for delivery systems, the report said he would post instructions on how to make a Cessna 182 aircraft from parts obtained separately.
Monday, March 31, 2008
From Geostrategy Direct
*cross posted from To Inform and Inflame and The Siren Voice
Monday, March 31, 2008
"FITNA" BACK ON LiveLeak.com!
It looks like freedom of speech has won again! Below is the statement made on LiveLeak.com.
Fitna the Movie: Geert Wilders’ film about the Quran (English) - Post Media Reply
Klik hier voor de Nederlandse versie van ’Fitna the Movie’
** 30/3/2008: Liveleak Update **
On the 28th of March LiveLeak.com was left with no other choice but to remove the film "fitna" from our servers following serious threats to our staff and their families. Since that time we have worked constantly on upgrading all security measures thus offering better protection for our staff and families. With these measures in place we have decided to once more make this video live on our site. We will not be pressured into censoring material which is legal and within our rules. We apologise for the removal and the delay in getting it back, but when you run a website you don’t consider that some people would be insecure enough to threaten our lives simply because they do not like the content of a video we neither produced nor endorsed but merely hosted.
Yes, and I can understand why you had to protect you families, and staff. The time you kept it off the air was enough of a victory for the enemy to last them a long time. Although you changed your stance, the die has been cast. Now the Radical Islamists will go after anyone thinking that their strategy works.
When LiveLeak stated that " In the end, the cost was too high". My first thought was; " WHAT COST? FREEDOM?
CENSORSHIP THROUGH FEAR!
FITNA, The Movie Pulled By LiveLeak.com Due To Threats!
Here is my video response.
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Muslim baptized by pope says life in danger
No surprise there. More on Magdi Allam's conversion; a story by Philip Pullella for Reuters:
VATICAN CITY (Reuters) - A Muslim author and critic of Islamic fundamentalism who was baptized a Catholic by Pope Benedict said on Sunday Islam is "physiologically violent" and he is now in great danger because of his conversion.
"I realize what I am going up against but I will confront my fate with my head high, with my back straight and the interior strength of one who is certain about his faith," said Magdi Allam.
In a surprise move on Saturday night, the pope baptized the 55-year-old, Egyptian-born Allam at an Easter eve service in St Peter's Basilica that was broadcast around the world.
The conversion of Allam to Christianity -- he took the name "Christian" for his baptism -- was kept secret until the Vatican disclosed it in a statement less than an hour before it began.
Writing in Sunday's edition of the leading Corriere della Sera, the newspaper of which he is a deputy director, Allam said: "... the root of evil is innate in an Islam that is physiologically violent and historically conflictual."
Allam, who is a strong supporter of Israel and who an Israeli newspaper once called a "Muslim Zionist," has lived under police protection following threats against him, particularly after he criticized Iran's position on Israel.
He said before converting he had continually asked himself why someone who had struggled for what he called "moderate Islam" was then "condemned to death in the name of Islam and on the basis of a Koranic legitimization." [...]
A telling question.
The Vatican appeared to be at pains to head off criticism from the Islamic world about the conversion.
"Conversion is a private matter, a personal thing and we hope that the baptism will not be interpreted negatively by Islam," Cardinal Giovanni Re told an Italian newspaper.
Still, Allam's highly public baptism by the pope shocked Italy's Muslim community, with some leaders openly questioning why the Vatican chose to shine such a big spotlight it.
"What amazes me is the high profile the Vatican has given this conversion," Yaha Sergio Yahe Pallavicini, vice-president of the Italian Islamic Religious Community, told Reuters. "Why could he have not done this in his local parish?"
Why indeed? But the same question can be turned around: Magdi Allam is an internationally famous journalist. Why, then, shouldn't his conversion be high-profile? That Pallavicini would prefer it hidden away suggests that he carries in his mental baggage the Sharia-based assumption that Christians should be quiet and submissive, private and unostentatious in their religious observances, so as to avoid offend the delicate sensibilities of Muslims.
But they are now likely to be very, very offended:
ANOTHER DEATH SENTENCE
Allam, the author of numerous books, said he realized that his conversion would likely procure him "another death sentence for apostasy," or the abandoning of one's faith.
But he said he was willing to risk it because he had "finally seen the light, thanks to divine grace."
Allam defended the pope in 2006 when the pontiff made a speech in Regensburg, Germany, that many Muslims perceived as depicting Islam as a violent faith.
He said he made his decision to convert after years of deep soul searching and asserted that the Catholic Church has been "too prudent about conversions of Muslims."...
Sunday, March 23, 2008
Saturday, March 22, 2008
Geert Wilders...Hero of Denmark
-cross posted from Fire Base America
*Who is doing more than Wilders to counter the encroachment of islam in the west? I wish I could say I am, but I can't. This man is literally putting his life on the line. I admire his courage and support him 100%.
DID YOU KNOW?
Did you know? I didn’t know! How could we? Did you know that 47 countries’ have reestablished their embassies in Iraq ? Did you know that the Iraqi government currently employs 1.2 million Iraqi people?
Did you know that 3100 schools have been renovated, 364 schools are under rehabilitation, 263 new schools are now under construction; and 38 new schools have been completed in Iraq ? Did you know that Iraq ’s higher educational structure consistsof 20 Universities, 46 Institutes or colleges and 4 research centers, all currently operating?
Did you know that 25 Iraq students departed for the United States in January 2005 for the re-established Fulbright program? Did you know that the Iraqi Navy is operational? They have 5 - 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment. Did you know that Iraq ’ s Air Force consists of three operational squadrons, Which includes 9 reconnaissance and 3 US C-130 transport aircraft (under Iraqi operational control) which operate day and night, and will soon add 16 UH-1 helicopters and 4 Bell Jet Rangers?
Did you know that Iraq has a counter-terrorist unit and a Commando Battalion? Did you know that the Iraqi Police Service has over 55,000 fully trained and equipped police officers? Did you know that there are 5 Police Academies in Iraq that produce over 3500 new officers every 8 weeks? Did you know there are more than 1100 building projects going on in Iraq ?
They include 364 schools, 67 public clinics, 15 hospitals, 83 railroad stations, 22 oil facilities, 93 water facilities and 69 electrical facilities. Did you know that 96% of Iraqi children under the age of 5 have received the first 2 series of polio vaccinations? Did you know that 4.3 million Iraqi children were enrolled in primary school by mid October? Did you know that there are 1,192,000 cell phone subscribers in Iraq and phone use has gone up 158%?
Did you know that Iraq has an independent media that consists of 75 radio stations, 180 newspapers and 10 television stations? Did you know that the Baghdad Stock Exchange opened in June of 2004? Did you know that 2 candidates in the Iraqi presidential election had a televised debate recently?
OF COURSE WE DIDN’T KNOW! WHY DIDN’T WE KNOW? BECAUSE OUR MEDIA WON’T TELL US!
Instead of reflecting our love for our country, we get photos of flag burning incidents at Abu Ghraib and people throwing snowballs at the presidential motorcades. Tragically, the lack of accentuating the positive in Iraq serves two purposes: It is intended to undermine the world’s perception of the United States thus minimizing consequent support; and it is intended to discourage American citizens.
---- Above facts are verifiable on the Department of Defense web site. http://www.defenselink.mil/
Did you know? I didn’t know, But I know now............Pass it on! Give it a Wide Dissemination!
Thursday, March 20, 2008
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Eurabia Exporting Jihad
Welcome to the magnificent New Multicultural Europe.
"Germany's First Suicide Bomber in Afghanistan?," by Matthias Gebauer, Yassin Musharbash and Holger Stark for Spiegel:
A young German-born Turk could possibly have carried out an attack in Afghanistan that killed two US soldiers. The Islamic Jihad Union claims 28-year-old Cüneyt C. from Bavaria was responsible for the March 3 attack, now the German authorities are desperately trying to find out the bomber's identity.
Since March 6, German investigators have also been looking into the incident. Ever since experts at the Berlin-based Joint Counter-Terrorism Center (GTAZ) discovered an Internet message that included the photograph of a grinning bearded man they have been pulling out all the stops to investigate the case. There are indications that the Khost bomber was no Afghan or Pakistani radical. In fact it is likely that the perpetrator was a Turkish citizen from Bavaria, born in Freising and regarded as a dangerous Islamist. If it was him, it would be nightmare for the investigators -- the first suicide bomber from Germany.
'Exchanging a Life of Luxury for Paradise'
The investigators first regarded the Internet message as pure propaganda. The terrorist group Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) wrote in Turkish that they had attacked "the military camp of the occupying force of the unbelievers," with 4.5 tons of explosives, "fully destroying" the US camp. The site gladly quotes the Taliban, who helped prepare the operation, and its reports of helicopters that took away the bodies. Instead of the two dead US soldiers, the IJU speaks of 60 victims.
The text then gets more flowery but also very concrete when it comes to details. Cüneyt C., also known as Saad Ebu Furkan, had "successfully carried out" the attack -- "a brave Turk, who came from Germany and exchanged his life of luxury for paradise." According to the text, "our brother" always prayed "to cause great damage to the unbelievers." With this attack Allah had now heard Cüneyt C.'s prayer. The message is signed "the Press Office of the Islamic Jihad Union."...
Wednesday, March 12, 2008
Radical "Leftists" Ambush Israeli Leader at Nazi Museum-- Call For Destruction of Israel
*A protestor is held by police officers as Israeli President Shimon Peres, not pictured, visits the Resistance and Deportation History Center in Lyon, central France, Wednesday, March 12, 2008.
Monday, March 10, 2008
Sunday, March 9, 2008
ONE MANS THOUGHTS ON OBAMA
I recieved a copy of this via email the other day, and since Siren has posted information concerning the " Muslim Incognito" Obama, I thought that I would add this here. Something to ponder, Hmmm?.....Infidel Dog
SAY WHAT, BARRACK?
Body: Say What, Barrack?
Body: By Paul R. Hollrah
Tuning in to C-Span recently, I found myself listening to a speech
by Senator Barrack Hussein Obama, Jr. He was standing in the pulpit
of a black church in Selma , Alabama , and as I studied the body
language of the dozen or so black ministers standing behind the
senator, I couldn't help but be reminded of the little head-bobbing
dolls that people used to place in the rear windows of their 1957
Chevrolets. If their reactions are any indication, the new
"Schlickmeister" of the Democrat Party is actually a pretty
accomplished public speaker.
However, as he spoke, I found my b.s. alarm going off, repeatedly.
But I couldn't quite figure out why until I actually read excerpts
of his speech several days later. Here's part of what he said:
"...something happened back here in Selma, Alabama. Something
happened in Birmingham that sent out what Bobby Kennedy called,
"ripples of hope all around the world." Something happened when a
bunch of women decided they were going to walk instead of ride the
bus after a long day of doing somebody else's laundry, looking after
somebody else's children.
"When (black) men who had PhD's decided 'that's enough' and 'we're
going to stand up for our dignity,' that sent a shout across oceans
so that my grandfather began to imagine something different for his
son. His son, who grew up herding goats in a small village in Africa
could suddenly set his sights a little higher and believe that maybe
a black man in this world had a chance.
"So the Kennedy's decided we're going to do an airlift. We're going
to go to Africa and start bringing young Africans over to this
country and give them scholarships to study so they can learn what a
wonderful country America is.
"This young man named Barack Obama got one of those tickets and came
over to this country. He met this woman whose great
great-great-great- grandfather had owned slaves; but she had a good
idea there was some craziness going on because they looked at each
other and they decided that we know that, (in) the world as it has
been, it might not be possible for us to get together and have a
child. There was something stirring across the country because of
what happened in Selma , Alabama , because some folks are willing to
march across a bridge. So they got together and Barack Obama Jr. Was
born. So don't tell me I don't have a claim on Selma , Alabama .
Don't tell me I'm not coming home to Selma , Alabama ."
Okay, so what's wrong with that? It all sounds good. But is it?
Obama told his audience that, because some folks had the courage to
"march across a bridge" in Selma , Alabama , his mother, a white
woman from Kansas , and his father, a black Muslim from Africa, took
heart. It gave them the courage to get married and have a child. The
problem with that characterization is that Barrack Obama, Jr., was
born on August 4, 1961, while the first of three marches across that
bridge in Selma didn't occur until March 7, 1965, at least five
years after Obama's parents met.
Obama went on to tell his audience that the Kennedys, Jack and
Bobby, decided to do an airlift. They would bring some young
Africans over so that they could be educated and learn all about
America . His grandfather heard that call and sent his son, Barrack
Obama, Sr., to America .
The problem with that scenario is that, having been born in August
1961, the future senator was not conceived until sometime in
November 1960. So if this African grandfather heard words that
''sent a shout across oceans,'' inspiring him to send his
goat-herder son to America , it was not a Democrat Jack Kennedy he
heard, nor his brother Bobby, it was a Republican President, Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Obama's speech is reminiscent of Al Gore's claim of having invented
the Internet, Hillary Clinton's claim of having been named after the
first man to climb Mt. Everest, even though she was born five years
and seven months before Sir Edmund climbed the mountain, and John
Kerry's imaginary trip to Cambodia .
As one of my black friends, Eddie Huff, has said, "We need to ask
some very serious questions of the senator from Illinois . It's not
enough to be black, it's not enough to be articulate, and it's not
enough to be eloquent and a media darling. The only question will be
how deaf an ear, or how blind an eye, will people turn in order to
turn a frog into a prince."
Friday, March 7, 2008
Islamist Threats Make RAF Order Personnel to Stop Wearing Uniforms
-Visit the British National Party
We're letting our worst enemies into our countries to slit our throats in our own backyards and our politicians are aiding and abetting our 'enemies within' with their lefty socialist, politically correct agendas.
Thursday, March 6, 2008
Coalition Of Southern California Groups Plan Rally Sunday Against Kosovo Independence
Thursday, February 28, 2008
U.K.: Hospital, Female Muslim Medics In Standoff Over Hygiene Rules
*picture from Fortress Australia
-read entire article from jihadwatch.org
"Perhaps these women should not be choosing medicine as a career if they feel unable to abide by the guidelines that everyone else has to follow."
*This is freakin' pathetic. Islamic Medical Association, Islamic Medical Association? I'm so ready to puke, I can feel the bile forming now. It's more important to adhere to religious beliefs on clothing than it is to adhere to cleanliness, a sterile hospital environment, and the safety of the patients, not to mention other hospital workers who are constantly catching one virus or cold after another as it is.
This, people, is a perfect example of why muslim countries are so third world, their health care so poor, and their death rates from disease so high. They don't mind being filthy as long as they're dressed according to what a 7th century book tells them. This is a great example of why this madness must stop. The door has to be shut on muslims and their sharia law bullshit.
-crossposted from Fire Base America
Adam Gadahn is dead!!!
A source tells The Jawa Report that Adam Gadahn is dead
Is American al Qaeda member and indicted traitor Adam Gadahn dead? Shortly after a U.S. Predator drone attack killed Abu Laith al-Libi last month rumors began to circulate on Islamic message board that Gadahn had been one of those killed in the raid. Later, a Pakistani newspaper quoted "sources" saying Gadahn was killed.
NBC News also claimed that it had a source in Pakistan who was friends with Adam Gadahn and that Gadahn had disappeared after the Predator strike. Gadahn's friends, said the story, were worried about him.
This week a trusted source revealed to me that he was hearing from Pakistan that Gadahn was most likely dead. I asked him if his sources weren't the same as NBC? No, he replied, he had a different source of information.
Then why hasn't the U.S. confirmed Gadahn's demise? Too many body parts, he said. Very little left of any one on the ground. Could take some time, or we may never have confirmation.
How much do I trust the person who told me this? On a scale of 1-10, he's an 11. It's more a question of his sources than anything else. His sources seem to believe Gadahn has gone to meet his 72 virgins.
So, is Adam Gadahn dead? I know we've been down this road before, and I know a lot of this is wishful thinking, but Magic Eight Ball says outlook good.
UPDATE: Just to make this clear, there is a major caveat here. That caveat is that my friend's source is in Pakistan. You know, the land where rumor & fact are sometimes indistinguishable to most. So, there was a reason I picked "Outlook good" and not "It is decidedly so" or "You may rely on it" from among the 20 Magic 8 Ball choices.
Having said that, we have at least three separate sources all claiming that Gadahn is either dead or missing. How sure is the "source"? Very sure.
YES HE IS DEAD....WOOOOO HOOOOOO!!!!!!
The National Intelligence Estimate - 2007
*cross posted from To Inform and To Inflame
(H/T NukeSpook)
We have all seen the stories in the news, spun to make it look like Bush lied about Iran and Iraq and that he had spun the 2003 and 2005 N.I.E.’s to make war:
FOXNews.com - Bush Administration Credibility Suffers After Iran ...
Attacking The NIE, By Kevin Drum - CBS News
The NIE in Doubt?
Dark Suspicions about the NIE
NPR: NIE Report on Iran Contradicts Bush Claims
NIE Report: Iran Halted Nuclear Weapons Program ...
Spinning the NIE Iran Report - TIME
Crooks and Liars » Countdown: Bushed!- No NIE, Mo Gonzo & DHS ...
NPR: Iran NIE Reopens Intelligence Debate
U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work - New York Times
Bothersome Intel on Iran Newsweek Periscope Newsweek.com
Olbermann’s Special Comment on Iran NIE: "Bush, Pathological Liar ...
Just way too many to list - these are good examples.
--------------------------------------------------
To the Point......................................
The N.I.E. is an intelligence summary written for the President of the United States and the National Security Council by sixteen of the primary Intelligence Agencies:
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
National Counterintelligence Executive [NCIX]
Central Intelligence Agency
National Reconnaissance Office
Department of Energy
Office of Naval Intelligence
Air Intelligence Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Department of State - INR - Bureau of Intelligence & Research
DEA
Department of the Treasury
Coast Guard
It’s purview:
"The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal."
Executive Order 12333
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and designed to help US
civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect US national security interests. NIEs usually provide information on the current state of play but are primarily "estimative"—that is, they make judgments about the likely course of future events and identify the implications for US policy.
The NIEs are typically requested by senior civilian and military policymakers, Congressional leaders and at times are initiated by the National Intelligence Council (NIC). Before a NIE is drafted, the relevant NIO is responsible for producing a concept paper or terms of reference (TOR) and circulates it throughout the Intelligence Community for comment. The TOR defines the key estimative questions, determines drafting responsibilities, and sets the drafting and publication schedule. One or more IC analysts are usually assigned to produce the initial text. The NIC then meets to critique the draft before it is circulated to the broader IC. Representatives from the relevant IC agencies meet to hone and coordinate line-by-line the full text of the NIE. Working with their Agencies, reps also assign the level of confidence they have in each key judgment.
IC reps discuss the quality of sources with collectors, and the National Clandestine Service vets the sources used to ensure the draft does not include any that have been recalled or otherwise seriously questioned. All NIEs are reviewed by National Intelligence Board, which is chaired by the DNI and is composed of the heads of relevant IC agencies. Once approved by the NIB, NIEs are briefed to the President and senior policymakers. The whole process of producing NIEs
normally takes at least several months.
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program
1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons
(please note highlighted areas, we will come back to those later)
Here is the rest of those judgements:
Key Judgments
A. We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program
1; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that the halt, and Tehran’s announcement of its decision to suspend its declared uranium enrichment program and sign an Additional Protocol to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty Safeguards Agreement, was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work.
• We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons.
• We judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (Because of intelligence gaps discussed elsewhere in this Estimate, however, DOE and the NIC
assess with only moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.)
• We assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons.
• We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.
• Tehran’s decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005. Our assessment
that the program probably was halted primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.
B. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge with moderate-to-high confidence it
has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material
for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it has not yet done.
C. We assess centrifuge enrichment is how Iran probably could first produce enough fissile material for a weapon, if it decides to do so. Iran resumed its declared centrifuge
enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the continued halt in the nuclear weapons program. Iran made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we
judge with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating them.
• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon is late 2009, but that this
is very unlikely.
• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010-2015 time frame.
(INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems.) All agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained until after 2015.
D. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so. For example,
Iran’s civilian uranium enrichment program is continuing. We also assess with high confidence that since fall 2003, Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons.
E. We do not have sufficient intelligence to judge confidently whether Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons program indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart the program.
• Our assessment that Iran halted the program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicates Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs. This, in turn, suggests that some combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways, might—if perceived by Iran’s leaders as credible—prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear weapons program. It is difficult to specify what such a combination might be.
• We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many
within the leadership probably see between nuclear weapons development and Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision
is inherently reversible.
F. We assess with moderate confidence that Iran probably would use covert facilities— rather than its declared nuclear sites—for the production of highly enriched uranium for a
weapon. A growing amount of intelligence indicates Iran was engaged in covert uranium conversion and uranium enrichment activity, but we judge that these efforts probably
were halted in response to the fall 2003 halt, and that these efforts probably had not been restarted through at least mid-2007.
G. We judge with high confidence that Iran will not be technically capable of producing and reprocessing enough plutonium for a weapon before about 2015.
H. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.
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Here is the context of those judgements:
What We Mean When We Say: An Explanation of Estimative Language
We use phrases such as we judge, we assess, and we estimate—and probabilistic terms such as probably and likely—to convey analytical assessments and judgments. Such statements are not facts, proof, or knowledge. These assessments and judgments generally are based on collected
information, which often is incomplete or fragmentary. Some assessments are built on previous judgments. In all cases, assessments and judgments are not intended to imply that we have "proof" that shows something to be a fact or that definitively links two items or issues.
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Ok , is everything becoming clearer now? You can plainly see it is riddled with doublespeak. In your own thoughts so far, what do you assess? Keep this thought in the front of your mind as you read on.
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Now here is the British assessment of same:
Global Security - MI6 - House of Commons Report - 20Feb2008
We conclude that although the sanctions currently in place against Iran act as a disincentive for its nuclear programme, they are not sufficiently robust to coax it into suspending its enrichment. We are concerned that the new political dynamic following the publication of the US National Intelligence Estimate, and underlying differences within the international community, mean future UN and EU sanctions are likely to remain ineffective and may inadvertently help President Ahmadinejad by providing him with a scapegoat for his economic failings.
In 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), an opposition group, publicly exposed the existence of a uranium enrichment site at Natanz, and the construction of a heavy water plant at Arak, which, once operational, would be capable of producing plutonium. Neither of these activities is illegal per se as Article IV of the NPT sets out the "inalienable right" of all States Parties to develop, research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, Iran had concluded a comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (the UN body that monitors nuclear activity and supervises compliance of the NPT) in 1974 under which it was required to be transparent about its facilities. In November 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that "Iran has concealed many aspects of its nuclear activities, with resultant breaches" of its reporting obligations under its Safeguards Agreement.
As the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) states, international concern was heightened by the fact that the facilities at Natanz and Arak were ’dual use’—
i.e. that they "could be used in civil or military programmes". Another NGO, the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), argues in its written submission that "what’s the point of hiding the country’s activities if there is no mala fides?", noting Iran’s counter-argument that the reluctance of the West to engage with it forced it to rely on the secret underground network of the rogue Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Iran also defended itself by arguing it is bound by a religious decree that prevents Islamic countries developing, producing or using nuclear weapons.
In its November 2007 Report on Iran’s nuclear programme, the IAEA stated that the level of uranium enrichment at Natanz was at roughly the level required to produce reactor fuel for a civil nuclear programme. It also stated that Iran had completed the installation of eighteen 164-machine cascades at its fuel enrichment plant, and that uranium had been fed in to each one. This provides for 2,952 operational centrifuges. BASIC notes "3,000 centrifuges running for long periods without breakdown could be enough to produce
enough fissile material for one nuclear bomb within a year", should Iran choose to do so.
On our visit to Iran, we heard from a number of interlocutors that Iran’s intention is to enrich uranium to a low level for use in its nuclear power plants. BASIC’s written evidence is sceptical about this claim, noting that there is as yet no finished reactor to load nuclear fuel. This argument was reinforced by Dr Howells when he appeared before us:
[D]eveloping or enriching uranium to the degree that the Iranians seem to be pressing for is like trying to manufacture petrol before you have taken your driving test or even bought a car. It does not make much sense. There is only one civil nuclear reactor being constructed at the moment, and that is the one at Bushehr, being constructed by the Russians, who have already told the Iranians that the very highly engineered fuel rods that will be required for that reactor will be supplied by Russia.
It is clear that Iran’s declared nuclear activities at Natanz could provide Iran with a path towards weapons-grade uranium in the coming years. Another possible route towards HEU would be the use of covert enrichment facilities. As we discuss below, Iran agreed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA in 2003, giving inspectors greater access to its nuclear activities. Since 2006, it has refused to implement the Additional Protocol, which has left the Agency unable, in its own words, "to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran." Mr Fitzpatrick comments that an unreported facility "cannot be totally ruled out", but notes that "no evidence has surfaced pointing to a parallel, covert facility." The 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate concluded "with moderate confidence" that Iran would likely use covert facilities rather than its declared facilities to enrich uranium Uranium enrichment is not the only route towards producing the fissile material for a nuclear weapon. In its memorandum to the Committee, the FCO comments that the heavy water research reactor being constructed at Arak would be "eminently suitable for producing weapons-grade plutonium." Iran claims that the facility only has peaceful purposes such as the production of radioisotopes for medical care. BASIC notes that Iran has restricted the access of IAEA inspectors to verify design work at the plant, and argues that the work at Arak "has been overlooked" by the West’s focus on uranium enrichment. The US National Intelligence Estimate judged with "high confidence" that Tehran would not be able to produce and reprocess enough plutonium for a nuclear weapon until about 2015. Elahe Mohtasham notes that once fully operational, the plant would be able to produce enough plutonium for one or two weapons a year.
We conclude that, whilst Iran’s suspension of an active nuclear weapons programme since 2003 is welcome, its continued enrichment activities and questions over its previous conduct mean its potential to develop such a programme remains. We further conclude that although technological constraints are likely to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, if that is its intention, in the near future, there is nevertheless a strong possibility that it could establish a ’breakout’ nuclear weapons capability by 2015.
Getting the picture?
Some more.......................
Gary Samore, a top arms control official in the Clinton administration and a director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, who told the Los Angeles Times in December that "The halting of the weaponization program in 2003 is less important from a proliferation standpoint than resumption of the enrichment program in 2006."
From the 2003 N.I.E.
* We have no evidence Iran wants to develop an ICBM. Even if Tehran wanted to, we assess that it would not be able to do so before 2010 because it lacks the economic resources and technological infrastructure
Doesn’t that contradict this?:
2005 National Intelligence Estimate that declared "with high confidence" that Iran was working to build a bomb.
August 2005 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) Information" about Iran’s alleged nuke weaponization program, turned over to the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency late last year, was presented to the IAEA Board of Governors by IAEA’s Deputy Director-General Olli Heinonen. The only "information" that was perhaps directly of a nuclear nature involved "fire sets," devices capable of supplying high-voltage, high-current pulses to multiple detonators, causing them to fire at predetermined times.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections since 2003 have revealed two decades’ worth of undeclared nuclear activities in Iran, including uranium enrichment and plutonium separation efforts. Iran agreed in 2003 to suspend sensitive activities in negotiations with Germany, France, and the UK (EU-3), which broke down
in August 2005. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors found Iran to be in noncompliance with its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreement and reported Iran’s case to the U.N. Security Council in February 2006. The Security Council called upon Iran to resuspend enrichment and reprocessing, reconsider
construction of its heavy water reactor, ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, and implement transparency measures. Iran continued enrichment activities and failed to meet the Security Council’s request, even after the permanent members plus Germany (P-5 +1) offered Iran a new proposal on June 6. The Security Council passed UNSCR 1696 on July 31, 2006, giving Iran a deadline of August 31 to comply. Iran still failed to suspend enrichment, which may prompt negotiations on sanctions.
CRS 22758 - 11/2007 (Congressional Research Service) These assessments do not mean, however, that there is universal agreement within the U.S. intelligence community on the issue of an Iranian ICBM. According to these unclassified statements, some argue that an Iranian ICBM test is likely before 2010, and very likely before 2015. Other U.S. officials believe, however, that there is "less than an even chance" for such a test before 2015. Furthermore, U.S. assessments are also conditional in that an Iranian ICBM capability would have to rely on access to foreign technology, from, for example, North Korea or Russia. Finally, it is argued that an Iranian ICBM could develop from an Iranian space program under which a space-launch vehicle program might be converted into an ICBM program. Some have argued that Iran could develop and test such a space launch vehicle by 2010.
The IAEA reported on February 27, 2006 that Iran has produced approximately 85 tons of uranium hexafluoride (UF6). If enriched through centrifuges to weapons-grade material – a capability Iran is working hard to master – this would be enough for 12 nuclear bombs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, to who actually wrote the report:
Several current and former high-level government officials familiar with the authors of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran described the report as a politically motivated document written by anti-Bush former State Department officials, who opposed sanctioning foreign governments and businesses.
The three main authors of this report are former State Department officials with previous reputations that should lead one to doubt their conclusions. All three are ex-bureaucrats who, as is generally true of State Department types, favor endless rounds of negotiation and "diplomacy" and oppose confrontation. These three officials, according to the Wall Street Journal, have "reputations as hyper-partisan anti-Bush officials".
They are Tom Fingar, formerly of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research; Vann Van Diepen, the National Intelligence Officer for WMD; and Kenneth Brill, the former U.S. Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Tom Fingar was a State Department employee who was an expert on China and Germany -- he has no notable experience, according to his bio in the Middle East and its geopolitics.
Vann Van Diepen is also a career State Department bureaucrat who, according to the New York Sun, is one of the State Department bureaucrats who want "revenge" for having their views regarding Iran ignored by the Bush Administration. He is now seeking to further his own agenda. As the Sun wrote in their editorial yesterday:
Vann Van Diepen, one of the estimate's main authors, has spent the last five years trying to get America to accept Iran's right to enrich uranium. Mr. Van Diepen no doubt reckons that in helping push the estimate through the system, he has succeeded in influencing the policy debate in Washington. The bureaucrats may even think they are stopping another war.
Vann Diepen also shares a lack of experience in dealing with Iran or the region.
The third main author comes in for particular criticism in the Wall Street Journal editorial. Kenneth Brill served as the US Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (the IAEA). This is an agency that has served to enable Iranian's quest for nuclear weapons. The head of the IAEA, Mohammed ElBaradei, has even been called a friend by the Iranian regime. As he should be, for he has been an enabler of its nuclear weapons program and has stiff-armed European Union diplomats who have worked to restrain Iran.
Elbaredei and the IAEA have over-reached and now seek to control diplomatic negotiations with Iran -- a function that is beyond its mandate. Brill was apparently unwilling to stop this mission creep and put an end to Elbaradei's efforts to help Iran. Or, as the Wall Street Journal hints, maybe he was just incompetent. This hint comes from former US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton's (who headed counter-proliferation efforts in the State Department previous to his UN posting) new book:
For a flavor of their political outlook, former Bush Administration antiproliferation official John Bolton recalls in his recent memoir that then-Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage "described Brill's efforts in Vienna, or lack thereof, as 'bull -- .'" Mr. Brill was "retired" from the State Department by Colin Powell before being rehired, over considerable internal and public protest, as head of the National Counter-Proliferation Center by then-National Intelligence Director John Negroponte.
Brill also has no previous history of experience dealing with Iran. (He graduated from Business School at Berkeley in 1973!).
All three of the authors of this NIE study are former State Department employees (none of them are nuclear physicists). All who are familiar with the ways of Washington know that the State Department is a fourth branch of government -- at least in its own collective mind -- that seeks to forge its own policies which may often conflict with the policies desired by its putative boss, the President.
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Now to put it all together for you to understand....(a few bombshells included)
February 26 of this year, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell explained: "As you know, there’s been confusion about what Iranian intentions are with regard to nuclear weapons. You know from our National Intelligence Estimate we released, we highlighted the fact that a specific portion of the program had been cancelled, and that was the technical design of the warhead.
What I’d just highlight for you is there are three parts to a nuclear-weapons program. First, you have to have fissile material. Second, you have a nuclear-weapons warhead design; and third, a means of delivery of that warhead, given that you had such a warhead. And what we highlighted that was cancelled was the specifics on the warhead design. They are still pursuing fissile material – which that is the most difficult challenge in a nuclear program. And they’re still doing the ballistic missile design and testing, which is probably the second-most difficult part."
It is an open question as to whether Iran has since restarted work on the warhead design. Regardless, given their progress in producing the fissile material, Iran could produce a workable nuclear device in "6 months to 12 months," according to testimony by McConnell to the House Intelligence Committee on February 7.
Now the IAEA's report is out, and they find the Iranians to be "generally truthful." The Iranians had "accidentally" received blueprints for a nuclear warhead (as part of an illegal transfer of nuclear know-how), which were "accidentally" discovered by the IAEA, and we are still supposed to believe that (a) they aren't working towards a nuclear weapon, (b) they don't have other blueprints with which they weren't quite so careless, and (c) the IAEA's standard for compliance has always been "generally truthful." This wishful thinking can only lead to one conclusion--a nuclear Iran. And, while the use of force to prevent such an outcome is certain to be painful for all parties involved, diplomacy just isn't going to work, because the IAEA is all trust, and no verify. If Iran has a blueprint for a bomb in hand – which is not improbable given the already wide proliferation of a dependable Chinese design – then all that really remains to be done is for Iran to complete its uranium enrichment program. The new National Intelligence Estimate may be accurate as far as it goes, but may not be revealing the whole story. For instance, it may be that while Iran halted work on bomb design and fabrication in Iran in 2003, it off-shored the work to, say, Syria. This scenario would be consistent with the hypothesis put forward a couple of weeks ago by Israeli Professor Uzi Even, one of the founders of Israel’s nuclear program, who maintains that the target the Israeli Air Force destroyed in Syria last September was not a nuclear reactor, as most experts concluded, but a nuclear bomb factory — a Rocky Flats on the Euphrates, as it were. If Even is right, it’s an odds-on bet that the plant was built for an Iranian weapons program rather than a Syrian one; the Syrians don’t have the money or the expertise necessary to enrich uranium or produce plutonium. The Iranians do. Rather, most evidence indicates that Iran has now embarked on a significant effort to acquire legally and openly all the technologies necessary for a nuclear power program, technologies that would enable it to also produce a nuclear weapon sometime in the next decade were it to decide to do so. This is a very difficult strategy to counter. Deals with the Abdul Qadeer Khan network to buy centrifuges also netted the mullahs instructions for how to turn uranium into metal and shape it into hemispheres, a process that has no use other than for nuclear weapons.Other suspicious activities, including experiments with Polonium-210, an element used to generate the neutrons necessary to initiate a nuclear chain reaction, bolster this judgment. Along with the construction of the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan with Chinese help and the exposure in late 2002 of Iran’s third major effort, the secret construction of uranium-enrichment facilities at Natanz At present, Iran seems to be following a “ Japan model” of acquiring all the technologies necessary for the production of fissile materials in order to both develop a full civilian nuclear complex and achieve a “virtual” nuclear status that could be made actual within months of a decision to do so. Like Japan, this program could be legal under existing international treaties, once past transgressions were either explained away, acknowledged and regretted, or simply excused.
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News:
National Council of Resistance of Iran - Iran opens nuke warhead center
Opposition: Iran opens warhead center, has accelerated nuclear program
LONDON -- An Iranian opposition group said Teheran has launched a new stage of its nuclear project, which included the establishment of a facility to produce warheads. The National Council of Resistance of Iran asserted that Iran also completed a command and control center to direct any nuclear attack.
"The Iranian regime is undoubtedly developing the nuclear bomb," NCRI representative Mohammad Mohaddessin said. "None of the essential work has been halted. All three parts have been speeded up."
At a briefing on Feb. 20, 2008 in Paris, Mohaddessin, citing sources within the nuclear project, said Iran received assistance from North Korea for the development of the nuclear warhead. He said development and production were taking place at a facility code-named B1-Nori-8500 at Khojir, southeast of Teheran.
"The clerical regime [in Iran] has not ended its nuclear weapons program, rather it has expedited its activities and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has taken greater control of the program," Mohaddessin, chairman of NCRI's foreign affairs committee, said.
Khojir has been directed by Iranian missile specialist Mehdi Naghiyan Fesharaki, Mohaddessin said. Mohaddessin said Fesharaki was transferred to Khojir in 2006 in wake of an apparent breakthrough in warhead development.
"This means the regime is getting to the point of connecting nuclear weapons to missiles," Mohaddessin said.
The Iranian regime was also said to have completed a C2 center for the nuclear weapons production program at Mujdeh outside Teheran in April 2007. Mohaddessin said the program was dubbed Lavizan-2.
"We would like to urgently ask the IAEA to immediately send inspectors to the sites," Mohaddessin said. "Time is running out to stop the regime acquiring a nuclear bomb. If we do not act today, tomorrow might be too late."
The bombshell revelations by Iran's parliament-in-exile, the National Council of Resistance (NCRI), about a working nuclear warhead development facility and a new command and control center for Iran's nuclear bomb-making only two days before the release of the report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) proved to be a major blow to the ruling Ayatollahs in Tehran.
In a news conference in Brussels on February 20, 2008, Mohammad Mohaddessin, the Chairman of the NCRI's Foreign Affairs Committee, announced that in April 2007, the Iranian regime's nuclear project entered a new phase. For the first time, a command and control center, known as Mojdeh site, was established to head up the drive to complete a nuclear bomb. A development facility called the "Field for Expansion of Deployment of Advanced Technologies" was set up in the Lavizan 2 site
Mojdeh site is managed by a scientist named Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi. A nuclear physicist attached to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC), Mahabadi reports directly to the defense minister, Mostafa Mohammad Najar. Many of the activities at the site are disguised as part of the IRGC's Malek Ashtar University, which acts more as the support center doing research and development of weapons for the Mojdeh site than a university.
Working on and coordinating activities on a neutron initiator; producing Polunium-210 and Beryllium for the trigger for an atomic bomb; casting and machining of uranium metals; research on the fissile material needed for the production of a bomb; laser enrichment of uranium; and research on high explosives, radiation detection, and protection against radioactive materials are among the activities carried out at the Mojdeh site.
The secret facility to make nuclear warheads is located at Khojir, a Defense Ministry missile site southeast of Tehran. This is a vast, 120-square kilometer area southeast of Tehran. It is riddled with various facilities and tunnels dedicated to nuclear and missile projects (see satellite imagery).
Khojir is heavily secured military area. Construction of secret military sites in this location began in 1989. This location works primarily on the manufacturing of missiles such as Shahab 3. However, new, detailed information reveals that Tehran is building nuclear warheads at this site. The project was codenamed 8500 and nicknamed the Alireza Nori Industry (see satellite imagery). The warheads are being designed for installation on Shahab 3 missiles, the most advanced version of which has a range of 2,000 kilometers.
In its February 20 news conference, the NCRI announced that the full details of the latest information obtained by the Resistance network inside Iran had been provided to the IAEA.
The Tehran regime's reaction to last week's timely revelations demonstrated what a blow it had been dealt. Ahmadinejad's anguish was evident in his remarks to the state-run news agencies about this latest political defeat resulting from the opposition's devastating disclosures: “The nuclear issue in its new form began in the beginning of the summer of 2002, when [the Iranian Mojahedin (PMOI/MEK)], published a report on the Natanz and Arak nuclear sites. The International Atomic Energy Agency got involved… and resolutions were adopted one after the other.”
Then on Monday, Mohammad Khazee, the Ayatollahs' ambassador to the United Nations, dedicated almost his entire interview with journalists to complaints about the decisive role the main Iranian opposition has played in exposing the Ayatollahs' nuclear sites.
Simon Smith, the chief British delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, said earlier this week that based on information presented by the IAEA to the IAEA's 35 board member nations, Iran may have continued work on nuclear weapons past 2003, the year U.S. intelligence reports indicated such activities had stopped. Earlier, Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell said there was no doubt that Iran had the scientific know-how, the technical capacity, and the industrial capability to develop nuclear weapons at some future point.
The NCRI's crucial revelations last week establish that the Ayatollahs' regime has indeed expedited its nuclear weapons activities, and that the IRGC has assumed command of a much larger segment of the nuclear drive. The United Nations Security Council should waste no time in adopting a decisive resolution to address Tehran's persistent violation of prior UN Security Resolutions. At the same time, a growing number of members of Congress from both sides of the isle believe that sanctions should be coupled with political pressure. The best option? Reach out to the Iranian opposition and remove all restrictions against them as they heighten their efforts to implement fundamental change in Iran.
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The IAEA report also raised the nuclear weaponization issue. “The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme,” the report said.
Evidently short of time to come up with manufactured and forged documents to whitewash these violations - as was evidently the case with some old pending question raise by the IAEA - Tehran “stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had shown to Iran was fabricated.”
The IAEA did not buy that. The report concluded by saying that “in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit created as a result,” the Director General “urges Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.”
That’s a diplo-speak for saying that given Tehran’s many years of lies and deception, the regime must abide by the UNSC resolutions and come clean on remaining questions dealing with secret facilities making nuclear warhead and other weaponization activities. (USADI)
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Summary
Threats against the United States and Israel by Iranian President Ahmadinejad – coupled with advances in the Iranian nuclear weapons program, support for terror, and resistance to international negotiations on its nuclear program – demonstrate that Iran is a security threat to our nation that requires high caliber intelligence support. The seriousness of the Iranian threat has been amplified by the recent rocket attacks against Israel by the Iranian-backed Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah, which, according to press accounts, has received as many as 10,000 rockets from Iran.
Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte provided his assessment in his 2006 Annual Threat Report that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. America's intelligence agencies have also assessed the following about the Iranian threat:
* Iran has conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly two decades in violation of its International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, and despite its claims to the contrary, Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. The U.S. Intelligence Community believes that Tehran probably has not yet produced or acquired the fissile material (weapons-grade nuclear fuel) needed to produce a nuclear weapon; Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte has stated that Iran will not be “in a position to have a nuclear weapon” until “sometime between the beginning of the next decade and the middle of the next decade”.
* Iran likely has an offensive chemical weapons research and development capability.
* Iran probably has an offensive biological weapons program.
* Iran has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. The U.S. Intelligence Community has raised the concern that Tehran may integrate nuclear weapons into its ballistic missiles.
* Iran provides funding, training, weapons, rockets, and other material support to terrorist groups in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territories, and elsewhere.
* Elements of the Iranian national security apparatus are actively supporting the insurgency in Iraq.
Iran's August 22, 2006 letter expressing its willingness to enter into "serious negotiations" on its nuclear program presents significant challenges for U.S. policymakers who must assess Iranian intentions, the likelihood that it would abide by a new diplomatic agreement, and whether Iran would exploit a new agreement to advance its nuclear weapons program. The U.S. Intelligence Community will play an important role in helping policymakers evaluate these questions. U.S. intelligence agencies will have to devote resources to verify adherence to whatever result negotiations might produce – Iran’s compliance with any agreement that may be reached, or the international community’s compliance with any new trade sanctions the international community may place on Iran should efforts to use negotiations to resolve the crisis fail.
The U.S. Intelligence Community believes Iran could have a nuclear weapon sometime in the beginning to the middle of the next decade. The timetable for an Iranian program depends on a wide range of factors – such as the acquisition of key components and materials, successful testing, outside assistance (if any), and the impact of domestic and international political pressures. It also depends on the assumption that Iran will overcome technical hurdles to master the technology at some point and that its leaders will not be deterred from developing nuclear weapons in the interim.
Increasing its number of centrifuges will dramatically decrease the time required for Iran to produce sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Former Iranian President Rafsanjani said on April 11, 2006 that Iran was producing enriched uranium in a small, 164-centrifuge cascade using “P-1” centrifuge technology, a basic Pakistani centrifuge design. Iran announced in April 2006 that it plans to build a 3,000-centrifuge cascade by early 2007 and ultimately plans to construct a 54,000 centrifuge cascade.28
* Theoretically, 3,000 "P-1" centrifuges could produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon in about a year using unenriched UF6. Diverting low-enriched uranium fuel, such as light water reactor fuel,29 for enrichment in a 3,000 "P-1"centrifuge cascade could produce enough fissile fuel for one nuclear bomb in less than two months.30
* P-2 centrifuges. “P-2” centrifuges could produce fissile fuel four times faster that "P-1" centrifuges. Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced on April 13, 2006 that that Iran “presently is conducting research” on P-2 centrifuges, a more advanced Pakistani technology. Iran admitted in January 2004 that it obtained plans for P-2 centrifuges from “a foreign intermediary” in 1994, but denied it had constructed any P-2 machines.31 Since that time, Iran has resisted providing details of its P-2 program to IAEA inspectors, who have only been allowed to observe the more basic P-1 centrifuges.32 A.Q. Khan provided P-2 centrifuges to the Libyan nuclear weapons program and could have provided this technology to Iran.
* Spent fuel from light water reactors. Extracting plutonium from a light water reactor's (LWR) spent fuel rods would produce weapons-grade fuel in less time than spinning unenriched UF6 in centrifuges. Spent fuel from the LWR Russia is building for Iran in the city of Bushehr could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium for 30 weapons per year if the fuel rods were diverted and reprocessed.33 Spent fuel from the LWRs that EU-3 states are proposing to give Iran as part of a new diplomatic agreement probably could be used to produce a similar amount of plutonium. While Russia has agreed to take back spent fuel from the Bushehr plant and store them in Russia, and although the fuel for reactors proposed by the Europeans should be placed under very strong international safeguards, Iran’s record of non-cooperation with the IAEA and its years of secret nuclear experiments raise questions as to whether Iran can be trusted to honor an agreement on the disposition of spent fuel rods
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Some History: What's Iran's plan?
Ilan Berman
Listen to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader: "In a dozen years," he's quoted by Adnkronos International, "Europe will be an Islamic continent."
Rather than rely on the shaky reputation of US spydom, the UN Security Council needs to look – as it has up to now – at Iran's continuing secrecy about its nuclear program. Why did it hide its covert work for 18 years? Why was Iran in a pell-mell rush to build 3,000 centrifuges for enriching uranium? It doesn't really need them to generate electricity from nuclear power, but such a step can produce bomb-grade uranium by next year – a "red line" not to be crossed, according to President Bush.
The ranian nuclear program "is without brakes and a rear gear,” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told religious leaders in Tehran in comments carried nationwide by state radio. "We dismantled the rear gear and brakes of the train and threw them away some time ago."
The first reason for Iran’s interest in a nuclear capability stems from the classical idea of “deterrence”: the notion that a robust strategic arsenal can help discourage external aggression. For the Iranian regime, such an assumption is a logical one to make. After all, ever since the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini swept to power in Tehran in 1979, the Islamic Republic he established has been at war with the world.
The founding ideology of the Iranian state, formulated by Khomeini while he was in exile in Iraq and France during the 1960s and 1970s, embraces the need for a “victorious and triumphant Islamic Revolution” in Iran and beyond. Twenty-eight years after the Islamic Revolution, that imperative is still very much official state policy, manifested through Iran’s deep support for a bevy of foreign terrorist groups, its troublemaking in Iraq, and its persistent efforts to export its radical principles throughout the region.
This sort of behavior naturally breeds hostility, so it is not surprising that Iran’s leaders have long been fearful of the possibility of foreign aggression—and desperate to find ways to forestall it. The resulting focus on a nuclear capability, revived by Iran’s ayatollahs during the mid-1980s in the midst of their grinding eight-year war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, is now over two decades old.
The past five years, moreover, have only served to reinforce the prudence of this effort. In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush identified Iran—along with Iraq and North Korea—as part of an “Axis of Evil” that was “arming to threaten the peace of the world.” In response, Bush pledged, “America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation's security.” Less than a year-and-a-half later, the rapid dismemberment of Saddam Hussein’s regime was watched closely from Tehran. So were the subsequent difficulties experienced by the U.S.-led Coalition in uncovering Saddam’s vaunted weapons of mass destruction. Unsurprisingly, Iran’s ayatollahs concluded that Saddam Hussein was toppled because he lacked the means by which to resolutely confront the United States.
The North Korean regime, by contrast, has survived—and thrived. Ever since his government’s unexpected announcement of a nascent nuclear capability in the fall of 2002, North Korea’s “Dear Leader,” Kim Jong-il, has managed to successfully stymie American policy in Asia, and to tilt the geopolitical playing field in his favor. Today, following nearly four years of diplomatic deadlock, the Bush administration appears to have acquiesced to a deal overwhelmingly favorable to the DPRK, one that explicitly recognizes the Stalinist state’s membership in the world’s “nuclear club.”
For the Iranian leadership, the lessons have been unmistakable; with nuclear weapons, it is possible to preempt “preemption” on the part of the United States, much the way North Korea appears to have done. Without them, adversaries of the United States might find that their days were numbered. And Iran’s ayatollahs appear to have decided that they need to follow in the footsteps of North Korea, lest they end up like Iraq.
Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, thinks that Iran has gone so far in its nuclear program that it is no longer relevant to demand that it should stop uranium enrichment.
Moreover, he believes that since the major world powers have come to terms with a nuclear North Korea, they should do the same toward Iran. It turns out that the head of an organization in charge of monitoring compliance with nuclear non-proliferation is urging the world community to accept the idea that another country will join the nuclear club in the near future.
On March 24, the UNSC approved Resolution 1747, providing for tougher sanctions compared with the previous resolution and giving Iran 60 days to stop all uranium enrichment. If you believe Iranian officials, a total of 1,600 centrifuges are currently in operation at the Natanz uranium enrichment facility. Upon the expiry of this deadline, ElBaradei is to submit to the Security Council a report on Iran's compliance with the resolution.
When the resolution was adopted, Iran had two cascades with 164 centrifuges each. Iran has refused to stop uranium enrichment. In order to reach an industrial level of nuclear fuel production for its nuclear power plants, Tehran intends to launch 3,000 centrifuges. The Iranian leaders have declared their intention to have more than 50,000 centrifuges up and running in order to meet the requirements of their civilian nuclear power industry.
However, there are other calculations that allow one to look at this problem from another angle. Experts believe that 3,000 centrifuges can enrich uranium to the level of 80 percent to 90 percent required for one nuclear bomb, whereas 50,000 can accomplish this task in five to seven weeks or two months at most.
(llan Berman ,vice president for policy of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. )
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This site first came to public attention in May 2003 when the Iranian opposition group, National Council for Resistance of Iran, announced that the site, called the Lavizan-Shian Technical Research Center, was associated with biological weapons research. They said the Center was affiliated with Malek-Ashtar University and was formed under the Ministry of Defense.
Later, a radiation detection device, called a whole body counter, was discovered to have been delivered to the site from overseas. The equipment itself is not direct evidence of a nuclear weapons program, but it is out of place at a site that was not declared by Iran to have any nuclear activity. Spare parts for the machine were also known to have been sent to the site. These additional pieces of equipment may actually have allowed modifications to the whole body counter that would make it more useful for a nuclear weapons program. However, the actual purpose and current location of the equipment remains unknown.
The site was photographed by DigitalGlobe's Quickbird commercial satellite in August 2003 and March 2004. The first image shows large buildings inside a secure perimeter. In the second image, the buildings were removed and the earth scraped. Even the roads and walkways were removed or covered.
This destruction at the site raised concerns because it is the type of measure Iran would need to take if it was trying to defeat the powerful environmental sampling capabilities of IAEA inspectors. At other sites, less extensive deception measures were employed by Iran, but the inspectors nonetheless discovered traces of enriched uranium, revealing details about activities at the sites and leading Iran to revise its declarations to the IAEA.
Yazd. - In February 2003, Iranian authorities admitted to producing yellowcake at a milling plant near the city of Yazd
Saghand - mine the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), an exiled Iranian opposition group, claims to have seen Chinese experts at the Saghand site.
Iran has admitted that Chinese experts participated in detailed exploration work for the mine. Experts from China's Beijing Research Institute of Uranium Geology have conducted scientific exchanges with Iranian nuclear scientists and have explored in Iran in the past.
Isfahan - Once mined and concentrated into yellowcake, the uranium must be converted to a gas. This gaseous form of uranium, called uranium hexafluoride (UF6), serves as the feedstock for centrifuges, which then enrich uranium to a form suitable for either reactor fuel or nuclear weapons. In 2000, the Iranian government informed the IAEA that a plant for uranium conversion was being constructed at Esfahan (Isfahan). In a speech to the IAEA in May 2003, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of the AEOI, said that the conversion facility, which is located at the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC), would be used to convert yellowcake into UF6
China is widely acknowledged to be the source of information for the conversion plant. As part of a 1997 agreement with the United States to prevent new cooperation and to halt all existing projects with Iran in the nuclear field, China pledged to cancel a project to help Iran build a conversion plant. Despite this promise, however, China appears to have provided Iran with a blueprint for the plant. Iran admits that the conversion plant is based on a design provided by a foreign supplier in the mid-1990s. China is also believed to have given Iran design information and test reports for equipment
In addition, China supplied uranium compounds in 1991, which Iran did not declare to the IAEA and which allowed Iran to conduct laboratory tests of the processes that will be used in the conversion plant. These compounds included 1000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4 and about 400 kg of natural UO2
There are a number of different ways to enrich uranium. Iran has focused on two: gas centrifuge and laser isotopic separation.
- Centrifuges
Centrifuge separation works by passing UF6 through high-speed rotational machines called centrifuges. The different weights of the uranium isotopes cause them to separate, with the heavier U-238 being thrown to the outside of the centrifuge and the lighter U-235 staying nearer the inside. Centrifuges require several repetitions with the enriched product to reach the desired level of concentration; more repetitions are required to obtain a higher concentration of U-235, which is necessary to produce weapon-grade fuel.
Iran's centrifuge program was launched in 1985 at facilities controlled by the AEOI in Tehran Around 1987, Iran received a centrifuge design through what the IAEA has termed a "foreign intermediary." During this first phase of Iran's centrifuge effort, Iran also obtained about 2,000 components from abroad. According to a February 2004 Malaysian police report, Iran received two containers of centrifuge parts, worth $3 million, through the Khan network. This transfer allegedly took place between 1994 and 1995.
In 1997, Iran moved its centrifuge development effort to the Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran. According to Iranian authorities, from 1997 through 2002, Kalaye was used to test and assemble centrifuges for uranium enrichment. In October 2003, after initial denials, Iran admitted that it had used 1.9 kg of UF6, allegedly imported from China in 1991, to test centrifuges at Kalaye. This work took place between 1998 and 2002 and, according to Iranian officials, achieved an enrichment level of 1.2% U-235. The IAEA first visited parts of Kalaye in March 2003 and Agency inspectors were allowed to take environmental samples at the site during a follow-up visit in August 2003. During this visit, inspectors noted that "considerable modification" had been made to the facility since their visit in March.
Beginning in 2002, Iran's centrifuge enrichment program was moved to Natanz , the location chosen for a 1,000 centrifuge pilot plant and a commercial-scale facility expected to house over 50,000 centrifuges. According to Iran, the Natanz site will produce nuclear fuel for power plants using uranium enriched from three to five percent U-235.
The Natanz site was revealed publicly in August 2002 by the NCRI and first visited by the IAEA in February 2003. In his report to the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stated that the site included a pilot plant that was "nearly ready for operation, and a much larger enrichment facility still under construction."
Iran first used UF6 to test a centrifuge at the pilot plant in June 2003, and in August 2003 tested a ten-machine cascade using UF6. Enrichment work at the pilot plant was suspended beginning in November 2003, following an agreement between Iran and Britain, France and Germany. However, Iran continued to manufacture centrifuge parts and assemble centrifuges at a number of workshops.
The machines at Natanz are of an early European design, similar to the P-1 centrifuge that has been under the control of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Pakistan, and which was stolen from Western Europe's Urenco program during the1970s and 1980s. According to a paper presented by France at a Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in May 2003, Iran is believed to have improved on the Pakistani design and now has "a model effective enough to consider enrichment on an industrial scale."
In addition to the P-1 centrifuge, Iran has a program to develop the more advanced P-2 model. The P-2 uses a maraging steel rotor with bellows and is similar to another early European centrifuge design. Iran received a design for the P-2 in 1994 from what the IAEA termed "foreign sources." The IAEA has concluded that Iran received the same drawings for the P-2 as Libya, which received the design, along with P-2 components, through the Khan network. According to Iran, mechanical testing of the P-2 rotors began in 2002, using carbon composite rotors manufactured domestically rather than rotors made with maraging steel, which Iran was unable to produce. The AEOI contracted with a private company based in Tehran to produce the rotors and to conduct the tests, allegedly without using nuclear material. Iran has procured magnets useful in the P-2 from Asian suppliers and has sought to acquire about 4,000 magnets suitable for the P-2 through a European intermediary.
- Laser Isotopic Separation
Because isotopes of different masses absorb different wavelengths of light, uranium isotopes can be separated by lasers precisely tuned to excite or ionize only the U-235. The U-235 is then separated out using a chemical reaction or magnetic forces that attract the excited atoms and leave behind the neutral ones. Iran has pursued two types of laser enrichment technology: the first, atomic vapor laser isotope separation (AVLIS), has achieved the greatest success; the second, molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS), appears not to have progressed as far.
Iran's laser enrichment program began before the 1979 revolution and relied on assistance from at least four foreign sources. In 1975, Iran contracted with a foreign supplier for a laboratory to study uranium metal. The laboratory, which was established at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC), contained two mass spectrometers. In the late 1970s, Iran contracted with a second supplier for help with the study of MLIS technology.
Then, in 1991, Iran ordered a Laser Spectroscopy Laboratory (LSL) and a Comprehensive Separation Laboratory (CSL) from a third supplier. Iran received 50 kg of natural uranium metal from the same supplier in 1993. Both laboratories were originally set up at the TNRC, where, between 1999 and 2000, eight kilograms of uranium metal were used in AVLIS enrichment experiments. The labs were then relocated to Lashkar Ab'ad in October 2002, where further AVLIS enrichment experiments were carried out using 22 kg of the uranium metal. Iran had previously established a pilot plant for laser enrichment at Lashkar Ab'ad. According to Iranian laboratory reports supplied to the IAEA, the average level of enrichment in these experiments was between eight and nine percent, and occasionally as high as 15%. This is above the level of three percent Iran had originally claimed. The IAEA has estimated that Iran's AVLIS installation at Lashkar Ab'ad had the capacity to produce one gram of uranium per hour, but could not operate continuously.
Iran contracted with a fourth supplier in the late 1990s for information and equipment related to laser enrichment but secured only some of the equipment it had requested, which was delivered to Lashkar Ab'ad. This equipment was suitable for use in AVLIS experiments.
After conducting this laboratory-scale work, and before informing the IAEA of it, Iran dismantled the relevant equipment and moved it to a storage facility at Karaj.
The Plutonium Path
Iran has also sought the ability to produce plutonium, a second fissile material that can be used to fuel nuclear weapons. But because plutonium exists naturally only in trace amounts, it must be manufactured in a nuclear reactor. This is done by bombarding U-238 reactor fuel with slow neutrons. When the U-238 captures a neutron, the U-239 isotope is produced, which decays into plutonium 239.
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
In the late 1960s, the United States supplied the TNRC with a five megawatt research reactor, hot cells and 93% enriched uranium reactor fuel. The United States stopped the fuel supply after the revolution. In the late 1980s, Argentina reportedly helped Iran reconfigure the reactor's core and later provided about 115 kg of uranium enriched to 20% U-235. This fuel was delivered in 1992.
In October 2003, Iran acknowledged that between 1988 and 1992 it had irradiated depleted uranium dioxide targets (UO2) in the reactor and then conducted plutonium separation experiments in hot cells in a nearby building. According to Iran, seven kilograms of UO2 were irradiated, three kilograms of which were processed into separated plutonium. The separated plutonium was presented to inspectors from the IAEA in November 2003 at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Laboratories, located at the TNRC. Iran estimated that it had produced 200 micrograms. However, the inspectors concluded that Iran understated the amount of plutonium and that the age of the plutonium was less than the 12-16 years Iran declared.
Light-water reactor at Bushehr
Russia is supplying Iran a 1,000 megawatt pressurized light-water reactor, which is under construction at the Iranian port of Bushehr. Russia took over the project in 1995, after West Germany halted its construction of the plant following the revolution. The plant is capable of contributing about four percent of Iran's total electricity output to the national power grid. The facility is also capable of providing Iran with enough weapon-grade plutonium to construct approximately 35 nuclear weapons annually. This assessment is based on an estimate of the plutonium output from a typical 1,000 megawatt pressurized light-water power reactor.
To use the plutonium from Bushehr in a nuclear weapon, however, Iran would have to construct a plant to extract plutonium from the spent reactor fuel. Iran would also have to keep the spent fuel. Russia appears to have an agreement with Iran to provide low-enriched uranium fuel through the first decade of the Bushehr plant's operation, and Russia has made delivery of the first core-load of fuel contingent on Iran's agreement to return the spent fuel to Russia. In a June 2003 interview, Russian Atomic Energy Minister Alexander Rumyantsev stated that Russia will not provide any fresh fuel to Iran until such an agreement is signed.
Nevertheless, Iran has made a number of purchasing attempts that indicate it seeks a capacity to reprocess and manipulate spent fuel. According to the May 2003 French NSG paper, Iran has sought to acquire high density radiation shielding windows for hot cells and 28 remote manipulators from the French nuclear industry.[69] Such equipment is designed for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel.
Heavy water technology
Iran has also sought to master heavy water technology. At a site in the Khondab area near Arak which is approximately 150 miles southwest of Tehran, Iran plans to develop a heavy water production plant and a heavy water research reactor. The existence of the heavy water production plant was first revealed by the NCRI in August 2002 and verified by commercial satellite imagery in December 2002. Iran has informed the IAEA that the facility will produce about 16 tons of heavy water annually. However, according to the French NSG paper, the plant will have the capacity to produce 100 tons of heavy water annually. In December 2003, Iranian Vice President Gholareza Aghazadeh said that some parts of the plant were operational and that the project had made "80% progress in general and 90% in equipment and installation."
On May 5, 2003, Iran also announced plans to build a 40 megawatt thermal heavy water research reactor, called the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40), at the same site. Construction of the reactor was expected to begin in June 2004. The reactor will be fueled by natural UO2 and will use heavy water as both a coolant and a moderator. The natural UO2 will be produced at a conversion facility in Esfahan (Isfahan) and made into fuel assemblies at a fuel manufacturing plant, also in Esfahan (Isfahan). Iran has admitted that it received some foreign assistance for the design of the reactor; the United States suspects that Russia provided the help.
According to Iranian authorities, the IR-40 will be used for research and development and for the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial use. However, most states that have built this type of reactor, which is widely considered larger than necessary for research, have used it to produce bombs. The well-known precedents are Israel's Dimona reactor, supplied by France and Norway, and India's Cirus reactor, supplied jointly by Canada and the United States.
n September 2003, the IAEA discovered that Iran had produced polonium-210, a radioisotope with a half-life of 138 days. Iran conducted Po-210 production experiments in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) between 1989 and 1993 by irradiating bismuth metal. One of the best-known uses for Po-210 is as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons. It also has civilian applications, such as in nuclear batteries. However, the IAEA considers the applications of Po-210-based nuclear batteries to be limited. Iran has said that the experiments were part of a study on neutron sources, but has been unable to provide documentation supporting this purported intent.
There have also been reports that Iran has sought deuterium gas from Russia. According to an intelligence report citing Russian sources that was circulated at the IAEA in July 2004, Iranian middlemen negotiated with companies in Russia to purchase deuterium gas after failing to produce it domestically. Deuterium gas is used, in conjunction with tritium, to boost the yield of fission bombs. Deuterium and tritium are hydrogen isotopes that release neutrons and energy when they fuse together in thermonuclear explosions.
In addition, the French intelligence services have reported that Iran has sought items useful for nuclear tests and simulation, including documentation on flash radiography equipment and pulse generators. Iran has also tried to purchase machines that can be used to fashion shapes of uranium or plutonium metal, such as isostatic presses and vacuum furnaces. And according to a May 2003 media report, a Swede of Iranian origin arranged the purchase of 44 high-voltage switches for Iran from Behlke Electronic GmbH, a German company. The switches, which were reportedly seized by German customs agents, could be used to trigger nuclear weapons.
Beyond its procurement efforts, the way in which Iran has organized and delegated its nuclear work to entities related to the defense ministry could suggest a military purpose. According to the IAEA, seven of the 13 workshops dedicated to the domestic production of centrifuge components are located on sites controlled by the ministry of defense
Finally, if Iran received the same package of nuclear goods from the Khan network as did Libya—an eventuality that is widely suspected—then it could have received the same Chinese-origin bomb design. China is believed to have supplied Pakistan with a tested nuclear bomb design in the early 1980s. It is reportedly this design that the Khan network resold to Libya, along with documents in Chinese containing detailed instructions on how to manufacture parts for and assemble an implosion-type device.
In a report to the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2003, following four months of Agency inspections in Iran, IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei concluded that Iran "has failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear material, the subsequent processing and use of that material and the declaration of facilities where the material was stored and processed." Since then, the IAEA has documented a number of instances in which Iran violated its safeguards agreement by failing to report:
* The import of nearly 2,000 kg of uranium compounds (1,000 kg of UF6, 400 kg of UF4 and 400 kg of UO2) in 1991] allegedly from China;
* The processing of 1.9 kg of UF6 (imported in 1991) in centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric Company, which produced 1.2% enriched uranium;
* The conversion of 9.43 kg of the UF4 imported in 1991 into UF6 in a laboratory at the TNRC;
* The production of uranium metal in a laboratory at the TNRC in the 1990s using 376.6 kg of UF4 imported in 1991;
* The production of 2.5 kg of UF4 using UO2 imported in 1991;
* The irradiation of several grams of UO2 in the TRR and its subsequent processing in a laboratory at the TNRC;
* The irradiation of 3 kg of depleted UO2 targets in the TRR and subsequent plutonium separation experiments carried out in hot cells at the TNRC, in which about 200 micrograms of plutonium were produced;
* The import of 50 kg of natural uranium metal in 1993
* The processing of 30 kg of the uranium metal imported in 1993 in two series of AVLIS enrichment experiments: first between 1999 and 2000 at the TNRC using 8 kg of uranium, and second at Lashkar Ab'ad
between October 2002 and February 2003 using 22g uranium metal
* Pilot-scale laser enrichment operations at the TNRC and Lashkar Ab'ad using imported equipment and failing to provide design information on these sites;
* The transfer of nuclear equipment and material used in laser experiments to a waste storage facility at Karaj, and failing to provide design information on this new site;
* The use of uranium compounds imported in 1977 and exempted from inspection (U3O8 and depleted UO2) and yellowcake imported in 1982 in experiments at two laboratories at the Esfahan (Isfahan) Nuclear
Technology Center;
* The use of depleted UO2, which Iran had originally declared as material lost during experiments, to produce UF4 in a laboratory at the TNRC
* Research and development work on a more advanced centrifuge, known as the P-2, which should have been disclosed to the IAEA in Iran's October 2003 full nuclear report to the Agency. This omission violated Iran's obligations under the IAEA's Additional Protocol, which Iran had agreed to honor, pending ratification in the Iranian parliament
On 05 January 2005 Mohamed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said "we expect to visit Parchin within the next days or a few weeks". Iran allowed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit the Parchin military site in January in the interests of transparency following the allegations, but the visit was limited to only one of four areas identified as being of potential interest and to only five buildings in that area.
On 01 March 2005 Iran turned down a request by the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency to make a second visit to the Parchin military site, which has been linked in allegations to nuclear weapons testing.
n a public session of the Iranian Parliament on 24 November 2003, Ahmad Shirzad, a deputy from the city of Isfahan, stated that there was a large nuclear-related underground facility near the city of Parchin, without providing an other details
*Locations declared in 2003
Nuclear:
* 1. Bonab (38°26'N, 45°54'E)--Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, unsafeguarded nuclear research facility
* 3. Chalus (36°39'N, 51°25'E)--possible underground facility for nuclear weapons development * 5. Karaj (35°49'N, 51°00'E)--Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine, laser enrichment equipment
* 5. Kolahdouz (35°44'N, 50°51'E)--possible nuclear weapons development facility
* 6. Tehran (35°42'N, 51°25'E)--
o Kalaye Electric Company (35°44'N, 51°34'E), centrifuge enrichment research facility under construction; former pilot enrichment facility
o Lavisan Shiyan Technical Research Center (35°46'20"N, 51°30'00"E), unknown nuclear research, facility razed in 2004
o Sharif University of Technology (35°42'10"N, 51°21'20"E), nuclear research facility o Tehran Nuclear Research Center:
+ Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (35°44'22"N, 51°23'18"E), experimental plutonium separation and uranium processing
+ Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Facility (35°44'22"N, 51°23'18"E), nuclear research facility
+ Tehran Research Reactor (35°44'18"N, 51°23'17"E), 5 MW light water research reactor, LEU fuel (116 kg of fuel, 20% U-235), experimental irradiation of uranium targets, under IAEA safeguards + laser enrichment plant
* 7. Parchin (35°32'00"N, 51°45'07"E)--suspected testing of explosive assemblies for nuclear weapons
* 10. Arak-- o Arak Heavy Water Facility (34°22'12"N, 49°14'41"E), production of heavy water for nuclear reactors
o IR-40 (34°22'21"N, 49°14'26"E), plutonium production reactor under construction * 11. Natanz--
o Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (33°43'33"N, 51°43'21"E), operational pilot uranium enrichment plant, 12,000 m2 above ground facility
o Fuel Enrichment Plant (33°43'32"N, 51°43'41"E), uranium enrichment plant under construction, 60,000 m2 underground facility
* 12. Esfahan--Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (32°34'51"N, 51°49'38"E):
o Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor, 30 kW light water research reactor, operational, HEU fuel (90% U-235), under IAEA safeguards
o Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, 100 W heavy water research reactor, operational, unenriched fuel (0.7% U-235), under IAEA safeguards
o Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, research reactor, operational o operational pilot fuel fabrication plant;
fuel fabrication plant under contruction (32°34'42"N, 51°49'39"E)
o underground facilities under construction (32°35'15"N, 51°47'49"E and 32°35'26"N, 51°49'04"E)
* 13. Yazd (32°29'N, 55°24'E)--uranium mining and milling
* 14. Darkhovin (30°44'N, 48°26'E)--possible underground facility for nuclear weapons development
* 17. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant--
o BNPP Unit 1 (28°49'46"N, 50°53'08"E)--near completion, 1 GW light reactor, LEU fuel (5% U-235)
o BNPP Unit 2 (28°49'38"N, 50°53'17"E)--under construction, 1.3 GW reactor
* 25. Neka (36°39'N, 53°18'E)--Gorgan al-Kabir Center, possible nuclear research facility Chemical/biological weapon-related:
* 2. Tabriz (38°05'N, 46°15'E)--possible biological weapons storage
* 4. Qazvin (36°15'N, 50°01'E)--nerve gas production
* 5. Karaj (35°49'N, 51°00'E)--chemical weapons production and storage; possible bioweapons research at Razi Institute
* 6. Tehran (35°42'N, 51°25'E)--possible bioweapons research at Pasteur Institute and Biotechnology Department of IROST
* 7. Parchin--chemical weapons production (35°31'32"N, 51°46'29"E and 35°32'59"N, 51°46'02"E) * 8. Damghan (36°10'N, 54°20'E)--production of chemical warheads for artillery shells and Scud missiles
* 12. Esfahan (32°39'N, 51°40'E)--chemical weapons production
* 15. Bandar Khomeini (30°25'N, 49°04'E)--chemical weapons production
* 16. Mahshar (30°28'N, 49°11'E)--possible chemical weapons production
* 18. Marvdasht (29°36'50"N, 52°32'20"E)--mustard gas production
* 20. Abu Musu Island (25°52'31"N, 55°01'58"E)--chemical/biological weapons storage Missile sites
* 9. Bakhtaran (34°22'N, 46°52'E)--possible underground launch site for Shahab-3 IRBMs
* 19. Sirri Island (25°55'N, 54°32'E)--HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs
* 20. Abu Musu Island (25°52'31"N, 55°01'58"E)--HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs; YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs
* 21. Queshm Island (26°58'N, 56°16'E)--hardened launch site for YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs; HY-1/CSS-C-2 Silkworm ASCMs; HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs
* 22. Kuhestak (26°48'N, 57°01'E)--hardened launch site for YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs
* 23. Bandar Abbas (27°09'N, 56°12'E)--launch site for HY-1/CSS-C-2 Silkworm ASCMs
* 24. Shahrud (36°26'N, 55°04'E)--testing site for Shahab-3 IRBMs
* 2. Tabriz (38°15'07"N, 46°07'41"E)--possible missile site
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Conclusion:
With all you have read, Has Iran stopped its Nuclear Weapon Development? The Mainstream Media and the Left side of the Aisle say so.
This is a quote from one of our Presidential contenders:
Sen. Barack Obama, D-Illinois, told the same forum that Bush "continues to not let facts get in the way of his ideology."
"They should have stopped the saber rattling; should have never started it. And they need, now, to aggressively move on the diplomatic front," he said.
He has access to almost everything I have posted here. Does he and the media have a comprehension problem?
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